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Public attention is directed to the Supreme Court of the United
.States just now because Mr. Justice Henry G. Brown, after a long
and honorable career on the bench,1 has resigned, largely because of
failing eyesight,2 and a successor to take the place vacated by him
in the Supreme Court is to be appointed. As the general public
knows altogether too little about the Supreme Court, now would
seem to be a good time to become better acquainted with its history,
functions and method of dispatching business.
Under the old Articles of Confederation, there was no separate
Supreme Court provided for the federated states, but to Congress
fell nearly all the judicial as well as all the executive and legislative
powers intrusted to the government.3 The Congress of the Con
federation did, to be sure, estabish in 178o "The Court of Appeals
in Cases of Capture,"4 but that court had simply to do with disputes
over vessels captured during the war on the high seas. There was
no other separate court, except that certain of the justices of the
highest courts and of the courts of admiralty of the different states
were designated by ordinance to hear and try persons charged with
piracies and felonies on the high seas.5 All other cases-mainly
disputes between states as to boundaries and between individuals
and states as to land grants-were tried before Congress. The liti-
gation was small-even the Court of Appeals in cases of capture
disposing of but 118 cases, 6-- but there was just enough of it to
awaken the minds of our forefathers to the need of a genuine
Supreme Court.
The lack of a separate judiciary "constituted one of the vital
defects of the confederation. Where there is no judicial depart-
ment to interpret, pronounce and execute the law, to decide contro-
versies and to enforce rights, the government must either perish by
its own imbecility or the other departments of government must
usurp powers for the purpose of commanding obedience, to the
i. Fifteen years as United States district judge and about the same length
of time as associate justice of the United States Supreme Court.
2. 18 Green Bag, 330.
3. Articles of Confederation, Art. IX.
4. Carson, Supreme Court of the United States, p. 55.
5. Ibid, p. 65.
6. Ibid, p. 6i.
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destruction of liberty."7 That lack was remedied by the constitu-
tional convention of 1787, which inserted this provision in Art. III
of the Constitution of the United States:
"The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish. The judges both of the
Supreme and inferior courts shall hold their offices during good
behavior and shall at stated times receive for their services a com-
pensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in
office."
Then the article went on to define the jurisdiction of the courts,
that is, what cases should come before them, giving to the Supreme
Court original jurisdiction, that is, the right to have suits begun in
the Supreme Court, "in all cases affecting ambassadors, other pub-
lic ministers and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a
party," but appellate jurisdiction only, that is, the right to determine
matters only on appeal or error after trial in an inferior court, as to
all other cases to which the judicial power of the United States
extends.8 The original jurisdiction is beyond interference by Con-
gress," but the appellate jurisdiction is expressly stated to be "with
such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress may
make."10
Under the Constitution, Congress had to determine how many
justices of the Supreme Court to have, what inferior courts to
create, what salaries to pay, what appellate jurisdiction the Supreme
Court should have, how cases should be brought to the Supreme
Court, and in general to put the whole judicial machinery in motion.
This matter was one of the first to engage the attention of Congress
and under the Act of Congress of September 24, 1789, the courts
7. II Story on the Constitution, 5th ed., Sec. 1574. See also the following
remarks of the late Justice Field at the Centenary Celebration of the United
States Supreme Court in i&8o: "The growing defect in the government under
the Articles of Confederation was the absence of any judicial power; it had
no tribunal to expound and enforce its laws."
"In no one particular was the difference between that government and
the one which superseded it more marked than in its judicial department
. . . No government is suited to a free people where a judicial depart-
ment does not exist with power to decide all judicial questions arising upon
its constitution and laws." 24 Am. Law Rev. 358-9.
8. Art. III, Sec. 2, United States Constitution.
9. "And it is upon the principle of the perfect independence of this court
that in cases where the Constitution gives it original jurisdiction the action
of Congress has not been deemed necessary to regulate its exercise or to pre-
scribe the process to be used to bring the parties before the Court or to carry
its judgment into execution." Taney, C.J., in Gordon v. U. S., 117 U. S. 697,
701.
io. U. S. Const., Art. III, Sec. 2.
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were organized.11 The details of that act are unimportant here,
except that the Supreme Court was to consist of a chief justice and
five associate justices, it taking four out of the six justices to con-
stitute a quorum and was to hold two terms of court a year, one
commencing the first Monday of February and the other the first
Monday of August. 2
Under the Act of September 24, 1789, the Supreme Court of the
United States organized in New York city, then the seat of the fed-
eral government with John Jay as chief justice. As there was not
a quorum, February i, 179o, the court did not sit until February 2.13
The grand jury for the United States celebrated the day of the first
sitting by giving a dinner to the justices. 14 That dinner was the
chief business transacted by the court, which, without having a
single case come before it, adjourned until August. 5
The business done by the court was for a number of years insig-
nificant. "From 179o to i8oo, only six cases were decided in which
were involved questions of constitutional law. Marshall, upon his
elevation to the Supreme bench (in 18oi) found only ten cases
awaiting adjudication."'0  There was so little business that the
chief justice varied his duties by running for governor of New York
in 1792, by spending a large part of a year negotiating with Great
Britain what is known as Jay's treaty of November i9, 1794, and
finally in 1795 resigned as chief justice to become governor of New
York. It was not indeed until after John Marshall became chief
ii. i Stats. at Large, 73. "In the last judicial paper from the pen of
Chief Justice Taney," the Chief Justice says, "the Supreme Court does not
owe its existence or its powers to the legislative department of the govern-
ment. It is created by the Constitution and represents one of the three great
divisions of power in the government of the United States, to each of which
the Constitution has assigned its appropriate duties and powers, and made
each independent of the other in performing its appropriate functions ...
The existence of this Court is as essential to the organization of the govern-
ment established by the Constitution as the election of the President or mem-
bers of' Congress. It is a tribunal which is ultimately to decide all judicial
questions confided to the government of the United States. No appeal is
given from its decision, nor any power given to the legislative or executive
departments to interfere with its judgments or process of execution. The
position and rank, therefore, assigned to this Court in the government of
the United States differ from that of the highest judicial power of England,
which is subordinate to the legislative power, and bound to obey any law that
Parliament may pass, although it may, in the opinion of the Court. be in con-
flict with the principles of Magna Charta or the Petition of Rights." H17
U. S. 697, 699-700.
12. Under the present act the Supreme Court holds only one term, begin-
ning the second Monda y in October. and lasting until May or June. The
present term will be known while it lasts as October Term, x9o6.
13. Carson, Supreme Court of the United States, p. i5o.
14. Ibid, p. '5y.
15. Ibid, p. 152.
16. Willoughby Supreme Court of the United States, p. 85.
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justice that the court was even respected. It had previously made
itself unpopular by holding that it had jurisdiction to entertain suits
by a private citizen of one State against another State.'7 A decision
which resulted in the Eleventh Amendment to the United States
Constitution.
Certain facts attendant upon Marshall's appointment as chief
justice are of sufficient importance to dwell upon. When it was
seen that Jefferson had been elected president of the United States
the federalists determined to fill all the offices they could, so that
Jefferson would have as few as possible to fill. Marshall's appoint-
ment as chief justice was proper enough-he took his seat in the
court February 4, I90I, at the very first session of the court ever
held in Washington-but it was followed so closely by the Act of
February 13, I8oi,18 creating a number of new federal courts, and
by President Adams' so-called "midnight" appointment in which
Marshall who, though chief justice, continued to act as Secretary
of State until Adams' term ended, took part, that it is not strange
that Jefferson felt bitter against Marshall. 19 The Act of February
13, I8oi, gave additional cause for bitterness because, further to tie
Jefferson's.hands as to judicial appointments, it provided that after
the next vacancy in the Supreme Court the court should consist of
only five justices, one chief justice and four associate justices. The
Act of February 13, i8oi, was repealed by the Act of March 8,
1802,20 and the Supreme Court continued to consist of six justices
till the Act of 18o7 increased the number to seven; but the Act of
April 29, 1802,21 suspended the session of the United States
Supreme Court until February, 1803, by cutting out the August
term for 1802 after the February term had been adjourned. That
suspension of the Supreme Court, growing out of the ill-feeling of
the time, is one of the significant things in the court's history.
Immediately upon the resumption of the sessions of the Supreme
Court came the decision of Marburv v. Madison,22 where Marshall
17. Chishoin v. Georgia, 2 Dall. (U. S.) 419.
8. 2 Stats. at Large, 89.
ig. Marshall seems to have signed commissions as Secretary of State till
the very moment when Jefferson's term began. Morse's Jefferson, p. 209.
If he did so, Jefferson's bitterness is fully explained.
20. 2 Stats. at Large, p. 132.
21. 2 Stats. at Large, p. 156.
22. 1 Cranch. 137. Carson suggests that Marshall's way of dealing in
Marbury v. Madison was due in part to the fact that he "smarted under a
sense of wrong growing out of the suspension of the sessions of the Supreme
Court by legislative artifices." Carson, Supreme Court of United States, p.
2o6. It may well be that he wanted to serve notice on Jefferson that such
suspension was illegal and while tolerated in the one instance would not be
allowed to be carried to an extreme.
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first announced the doctrine that the Supreme Court could declare
an act of Congress to be unconstitutional. The era of constitutional
decisions by Marshall had begun.
It is not the purpose of this paper to deal with the constitutional
or other decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. But
the political character acquired by the court as a result of those
decisions needs emphasis.
. From the time of Marbury v. Madison the Supreme Court of
the United States has stood as the conservator of the United States
Constitution. Whether rightly or wrongly the court has affirmed
the right to declare null and void all laws, state as well as national,
which it regards as clearly inconsistent with the federal constitu-
tion. It is this right to declare laws unconstitutional which caused
Sir Henry Maine to write that "the Supreme Court of the United
States is not only a most interesting but a virtually unique creation
of the founders of the Constitution," 23 and that "the success of this
experiment has blinded men in its novelty. There is no exact pre-
cedent for it either in the ancient or in the modern world."2' As
De Tocqueville points out "whenever a law which the judge holds to
be unconstitutional is argued in a tribunal of the United States, he
may refuse to admit it as a rule; this power is the only one which
is peculiar to the American magistrate, but it gives rise to immense
political influence."25 What keeps the political influence of the
Supreme Court from being so apparent is that the court never passes
upon the constitutionality of a statute except in an actual case pend-
ing before it. In 1793, during the controversy with the French
Minister Genet, over the right claimed by him to refit as a priva-
teer at an American port a captured English ship, President Wash-
ington, by the advice of his cabinet, asked the United States
Supreme Court justices questions about the true interpretation of the
treaties with France, but the justices declined to answer on the
ground that they could decide only questions growing out of some
case actually before them.26 That early stand of the Supreme Court
of the United States, ever since adhered to by that court, has been
the means of keeping the Supreme Court an essentially judicial and
23. Maine's popular Government (Henry Holt & Co., i886 ed.) p. 217.
See Hannis Taylor's heading "Supreme Court of the United States has no
prototype in history." Taylor's Jurisdiction and Procedure of the United
States Supreme Court, Sec. i.
2. Maine's Popular Government, p. 218.
25. De Tocqueville, Democracy in America (Longmans, Green & Co.,
1889, ed.) Vol. I, p. 94.
26. Marshall's Life of Washington, V, 433, 441; Baldwin's American
Judiciary, pp. 32-3.
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only indirectly a political body. Because an American judge can-
not attack legislation openly and directly, but must wait for a case
to be brought before him to attack it, and because when a case call-
ing for a law to be declared unconstitutional, comes before him, he
cannot refuse to decide it,27 the political effect of his decision is
regarded by the public as accidental and the judicial nature of his
work thus obscures the political.
28
But the Supreme Court of the United States shares this kind of
uniqueness with the other federal courts and with the state courts.
29
The state courts may declare laws to be unconstitutional, not only
bccause they violate the state constitutions, but also because they are
inconsistent with the federal Constitution. The latter document is
"the supreme law of the land and the judges in every State shall be
bound thereby."3 0  The state courts, therefore, perform this political
work; but as to the federal Constitution, the Supreme Court of. the
United States is the final arbiter.
27. The American judge "is brought into the political arena independently
of his own will. He only judges the law because he is obliged to judge a
case. The political question which he is called upon to resolve is connected
with the interest of the suitors. and he cannot refuse to decide it without
abdicating the duties of his post." De Tocqueville's Democracy in America,
Vol. I, p. 99.
28. "The success of the Supreme Court of the United States largely
results from its following this mode of deciding questions of constitu tionality
and unconstitutionality. The process is slower, but it is freer from suspicions
of pressure and much less provocative of jealousy than the submission of broad
and emergent political propositions to a judicial body; and this submission is
what an European foreigner thinks of when he contemplates a court of jus-
tice deciding on alleged violations of a constitutional rule or principle."
Maine's Popular Government, 223-4.
29. The United States Supreme Court does have some features peculiarly
its own, however. Under the Judiciary Act it is given authority to review
and set aside any decision of the highest court of a state which, in its judg-
ment, infringes the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States.
United States Rev. Stats., Sec. 709. Moreover, having original jurisdiction of
controversies to which a state is a party, the Supreme Court of the United
States may summon a sovereign state of the union before its bar. The exer-
cise of these powers over states by the United States Supreme Court, so
astonishing to foreigners, has become an everyday affair with us.
3o. U. S. Const., Art. VI. "And here it is appropriate to say that the duty
of expounding the Constitution of the United States has not devolved alone
upon the courts of the Union. From the organization of our government to
the present time that duty has been shared by the courts of the states. Con-
gress has taken care to provide'that the original jurisdiction of the courts of
the Union of suits at law and in equity arising under the Constitution and
laws of the United States or under treaties with foreign countries shall be
concurrent with that of the courts of the several states. This feature of ourjudicial system has had much to do with creating and perpetuating the feeling
that the government of the United States is not a foreign government, but a
government of the people of all the states, ordained by them to accomplish
objects pertaining to the whole country, which could not be efficiently achieved
by any government except one deriving its authority from all the people."
Mr. Justice Harlan in Carson's United States Supreme Court, p. 723.
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Before we leave the political nature of the Supreme Court, a
word should be said about the service of some of the justices of that
court on the Hayes-Tilden electoral commission. That commission
consisted of five members chosen by the United States Senate, five
members chosen by the National House of Representatives, and five
justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. The result was
a bad thing for the Supreme Court. As Mr. Woodrow Wilson
points out: "Unfortunately, however, every vote of the commission
was a vote upon partisan lines. It contained eight republican and
seven democratic members, and in each case all disputed questions
were decided in favor of the republicans by a vote of eight to seven.
. . .Even the members of the Supreme Court had voted as par-
tisans."2 1
Because of the political nature of the United States Supreme
Court, a word is necessary -about the appointment of justices. The
appointments to the Supreme Court of the United States have nat-
urally been made along party lines, though in i893 President Harri-
son, a republican, appointed Howell E. Jackson, a democrat, as asso-
ciate justice of that court. Mr. Justice Jackson was an able judge,32
but the precedent set by his appointment will seldom, if ever, be fol-
lowed. The appointees of that court hold for life, the design of the
framers of the Constitution being thereby to render them independ-
ent of the legislative and executive departments, 3 and the political
power of the Supreme Court is far too great and too certain to be
called upon during the life term of an appointee for presidents to be
willing to appoint justices of opposite political faith to their own.
It must not be supposed, however, that a Supreme Court justice
remains a deliberate or even an extreme partisan on the bench. To
the layman it is hardly comprehensible, but to the lawyer it is per-
fectly obvious that the ermine tempers the man.34 It has been truly
31. Wilson's Division and Reunion, I829-I889, pp. 285-6.
32. See Mr. Justice Harlan's appreciative remark in 3o Am. Law Rev. 9o2.
33. Hamilton in the Federalist (Lodge's edition) No. LXXVIII, p. 483;
Bryce's American Commonwealth, Vol. I, p. 229-30.
34. The most conspicuous instance of non-partisanship on the bench was
that of Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase. He had been a strong political par-
tisan and stepped from the cabinet to the chief justiceship; but "from the
first moment he drew the judicial robes around him, he viewed all questions
submitted to him as a judge in the calm atmosphere of the bench and with
the deliberate consideration of one who feels that lie is determining issues
for the remote and unknown future of a great people." (Mr. Justice Clifford
in i6 Wall, p. 15). It fell to his lot to review as judge his acts as Secretary
of the Treasury in issuing legal tender paper money and to insist in the
capacity of judge that his acts in the capacity of Secretary of the Treasury
were wrong; and he maintained his insistence, although the Supreme Court,
after the appointment of Justices Bradley and Strong, differed from him.
Though we now think that he was right as Secretary of the Treasury and
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fortunate for the country that since the time of Marshall an appoint-
ment to the Supreme Court of the United States has always been
regarded as an ultimate ambition by appointees, for that has made it
possible for us to say of the court that the hope of personal politi-
cal preferment has never shaped one of its decisions. But while the
judicial ermine ennobles the man it covers, the fact remains that the
era of Marshall in the Supreme Court was of a different tenor from
that of Taney and that of Taney of a different tenor from the period
during which Chase, Waite and Fuller have successively presided
over the court, the differences being explainable only by the political
proclivities of the justices of each period. It goes without saying
that "in none of these three periods can the judges be charged with
any prostitution of their functions to party purposes. Their actions
flowed naturally from the habits of thought they had formed before
their accession to the bench, and from the sympathy they could. not
but feel with the doctrines in whose behalf they had contended."3 5
Yet the general result is decidedly unfavorable, and properly so, to
the appointment of justices from other than the party in power.38
What a president should try to do is to get the ablest judicial minds
of his own party, and while precedent enables him, if he chooses, to
take his appointees from his own cabinet, his choice should be so
governed as not to impair the confidence of the people in the reason-
able impartiality of the court. .Of late years, there has been no dan-
ger of any president neglecting this duty.3 7
The business of the Supreme Court of the United States was
light down to the Civil War. During the first few years of Mar-
shall's term there were only twenty-four cases a year. From 1826
to 1830 the cases averaged about fifty-eight a year. "In 1836 when
Roger B. Taney succeeded Marshall as chief justice the number was
only thirty-seven. From 1830 to 185o, the increase was also very
gradual. Within the five years ending with i85o the number of
wrong as judge, all must admire and honor him for that high ideal of judi-
cial duty which forced. him to condemn his own previous acts, even though
the majority of the court of which he was a member ultimately approved
those acts.
35. Bryce's American Commonwealth, Vol. I, p. 274-5.
36. Judge Simeon E. Baldwin in writing of the Hayes-Tilden episode
says: "The country could not fail to see that judges, as well as other public
men, may be insensibly influenced by their political affiliations and regarded
the whole matter as a new proof of the wisdom of separating the judiciary
from any unjudicial participation in the decision of political issues." Bald-
win's American Judiciary, p. 51.
37. Only once has an attempt been made to impeach a justice of the
Supreme Court of the United States, and that attempt-the impeachment of
Justice Samuel Chase in i8o4-resulted in an acquittal.
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appeals brought into the court, including those docketed and dis-
missed without argument, was three hundred and fifty-seven, or an
average of seventy-one each year. The court was then able to dis-
pose of its entire docket during a session of three months." 38  It is
doubtless well for the country that in the formative period of our
constitutional law the justices had plenty of time to weigh their
decisions carefully. After the Civil War the business of the court
Was greatly increased and the court finally got so behind in its
work" that the Act of March 3, 1891,40 was passed creating the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals with final jurisdiction on
appeal and error in certain cases. 41 Since then the Supreme Court
has kept pretty well up with its docket.42
Though the business of the court was small at the time, the num-
ber of the justices of the Supreme Court was raised in 1807 from
six to seven 2  and in 1837 from seven to nine.43  Nine the num-
ber remained until by the Act of March 3, 1863, it was increased to
ten.44 But the Act of July 23, i866,45 passed to prevent President
Johnson from making objectionable appointments, provided that no
vacancies in the Supreme Court should be filled until the number of
associate justices should be reduced to six and thereafter the court
should consist of a chief justice and six associate justices. When
President Johnson had been succeeded by President Grant the Act
38. "The Needs of the Supreme Court" by Mr. Justice Strong, 132 No.
Am. Rev. 437.-
39. In October, 189o term, the Court had 1816 cases on its docket and dis-
posed of 617 (See 14o U. S. Appendix). In October, x8gi term, the new
appellate cases were reduced by the new act, so that the Court had only 1582
cases on its docket and it disposed of 496 of those (See 145 U. S. Appendix).
In those days it took three years to reach a case for argument.
40. 26 Stats, at Large, 826.
41. Since the creation of the Circuit Courts of Appeal the Supreme Court
has jurisdiction of appeals from the Circuit or District Courts onlv in the fol-
litwing cases: "In any case in which the jurisdiction of the Court is in issue.
From the final sentences and decrees in prize causes. In cases of
conviction of a capital crime. In any case that involves the construction or
application of the Constitution of the United States. In any case in which
the constitutionality of any law of the United States or the validity or con-
struction of any treaty made under its authority is drawn in question. In
any case in which the constitution or a law of a state is claimed to be in con-
travention of the Constitution of the United States." i U. S. Comp. Stats.
(1goI) p. 549. In all other cases the appellate jurisdiction is in the Circuit
Courts of Appeals.
42. Under date of September 27, i9o6, the Clerk of the Supreme Court
writes: "At the last term there were 768 cases on the docket of this Court,
of which 463 were disposed of, leaving 3o5 at the adjournment of the Court
in May last; 104 cases have been filed since, making a total of 4o9 cases on
the docket to-day for the October term, igo6."
42. 2 Stats at Large, 42t.
43. Act of March 3, i837, 5 Stats. at Large, 176.
44. 12 Stats. at Large, 794.
45. 14 Stats. at Large, 2o9.
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of April 1o, 1869,46 increased the number again to nine, any six to
constitute a quorum. Nine the number still remains.
In this changeable number of the Supreme Court justices lies a
great danger. It has often been charged that the appointments
made by President Grant under the Act of April io, 1869, were for
the deliberate purpose of assuring a decision upholding the Civil
War issue of legal tender paper money.47 What the real facts are
will probably never be known and every historian ought to do what
the lawyer necessarily does, and that is, give President Grant and
the Supreme Court the benefit of the doubt. That Justices Bradley
and Strong, President Grant's appointees, men of unquestioned abil-
ity, decided the way they believed cannot be denied, and if President
Grant selected them because he knew they would decide as they did
and without pre-arrangement of any kind with them, he did what, as
executive, he had a perfect right to do. But though we now believe
that the Supreme Court of the United States was not "packed," in
any objectionable sense of the word, with reference to the legal ten-
der cases, 48 the fact that at any time the number of the Supreme
Court justices can be increased and new appointments made for the
express purpose of overturning Supreme Court decisions is full of
grave import. With that fact must be considered the temporary
legislative "suspension" of the sessions of the court in Jefferson's
time and the power of Congress to restrict and regulate the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The latter power, which has
been exercised to save the court from overwork, has also been used
to keep the court from considering a habeas corpus case,4 9 and dur-
46. i6 Stats. at Large, 44.
47. Carson insists (Supreme Court of the United States, p. 449, note 2),
that the charge is disproven by showing that the nominations of Justices
Strong and Bradley were sent to the Senate on the very day that the original
legal tender case-Hepburn v. Grisvold, 8 Wall. 6o3-was decided, which
was February 7, i87o; but the original report of the case shows that the case
was decided in conference November 27. 1869 (8 Wall. 626), and on Jan-
uary 29, i87o, the majority opinion was directed to be read (Ibid), so that
if knowledge of the situation had accidentally leaked out. as could well be the
case without intentional blame on anybody's part. President Grant might
have selected judges whom he knew would favor upholding legal-tender
paper money. George S. Boutwell who was Grant's Secretary of the Treasury
when the cases were decided states that Chief Justice Chase told him of the
conclusion of the Court in Hepburn v. Griszvold "two weeks in advance of the
delivery of the opinion" Boutwell's Sixty Years in Public Affairs, Vol. IV, p.
209.
48. Whether earlier judicial appointments and the increase of justices in
1837 were determined upon in the interests of slavery, as Von Holtz inti-
mates. will doubtless never be known. Willoughby, Supreme Court of the
United States, pp. 96-99.
49. "A man named McArdle of Mississippi obtained a writ of habeas
corpus from a circuit judge to the military commission trying him. Failing
of release, he appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. The case,
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ing the" Civil War an attempt was made to "regulate" the appellate
jurisdiction by an act requiring the concurrence of two-thirds of the
members of the whole court before an act of Congress could be
declared invalid.50 All of these incidents show the extent to which
the president and Congress, acting in unison, could tie the hands of
the Supreme Court and even through the addition of new justices
determine its decisions. It makes the Supreme Court unable to
defeat the permanent will of an aroused and reckless people; and
renders it possible to see a faint resemblance between the Supreme
Court's relation to the other departments of the United States gov-
ernment and the relation of the British House of Lords, which may
be overwhelmed at any time by the creation of enough new peers for
the purpose, bears to the British House of Commons. Fortunately
th American people have never been reckless with reference to
the Federal Judiciary. All must agree with Mr. Bryce, however,
that the incident of the legal tender decisions "disclosed a weak
point in the constitution of the Supreme Court tribunal which may
some day prove fatal to its usefulness."51
While the Supreme Court of the United States suffered in public
estimation from the Dred Scott decision,52 from the legal tender epi-
sode cases,5" from the Hayes-Tilden Commission incident, and from
the income tax case reversal, 4 it is deservedly strong in the estima-
however, did not reach decision, for Congress, fearing the action of the
Court upon the reconstruction governments, the constitutionality of which
was involved in the case, passed a law taking away the right of appeal in such
cases." (Willoughby Supreme Court of the United States, pp. ioi-2.) See
Act of February 5, 1867, in 14 Stats. at Large, 385, providing for appeals in
habeas corpus cases, the last clause of which reads: "This act shall not apply
to the case of any person who is or may be held in the custody of the mili-
tary authorities of the United States charged with any military offense, or
with having aided or abetted rebellion against the government of the United
States prior to the passage of this act."
50. Willoughby, Supreme Court of the United States, p. io2.
51. Bryce's Am. Com., Vol. I, p. 27o. Right here we should notice that
the judiciary is necessarily weaker than the legislative and executive depart-
ments of the government. Hamilton stated this proposition fully in the Fed-
eralist (Lodge's Ed. LXVIII, p. 483) and the late Justice Miller of the
Supreme Court put it in these words: "The judicial branch of the govern-
ment . . . has no army, it has no navy and it has no purse. It has no
patronage, it has no officers except its clerks and marshalls and the latter
are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. They are the
officers to whom its processes are sent for the enforcement of its judgments,
but they may be removed at any time by the executive. . . . The judges
themselves are dependent upon appropriations made by the legislature for the
payment of the salaries which support them while engaged in the functions
of their office," and he adds: "It must rely upon the confidence and respect
of the public for its just weight and influence." Miller on the Const. of U. S.,
p. 417-18.
52. Scott v. Sanford, i9 How. 393.
53. Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 603; Knox v. Lee, i3 Wall. 457.
54. Pollock v. Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429; Hyde v. Trust Co., 158 U. S. 6Oi.
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tion of the people of the United States just now and it rests with us
to see that it remains so. We must always remember that the only
thing which in the time of excitement will stand in the way of a
"packing" of the Supreme Court of the United States is the poli-
tician's "fear of the people, whose broad good sense and attachment
to the great principles of the Constitution may be generally relied on
to condemn such a perversion of its form. . . . To the people
we come sooner or later; it is upon their wisdom and self-restraint
that the stability of the most cunningly devised scheme of govern-
ment will in the last resort depend." 55
One of the strongest claims of the United States Supreme Court
to public respect and confidence lies in the thoroughness with which
it does its work. After every case is submitted, whether with or
without argument, each justice goes over the records and briefs.
Then, at a conference of the justices, the case is discussed. Follow-
ing the discussion the roll is called and the justices vote. Following
the roll call, the chief justice, without consulting anyone, assigns
the writing of the opinion to one of the justices. The latter .pre-
pares the opinion and it is privately printed and sent to all of the
justices. Each justice scrutinizes it and makes suggestions for
changes. All changes not agreed to are considered in conference
and voted upon. After all changes are agreed upon and the opinion
expresses the final conclusions of the court, it is printed and is
announced in the regular way. "When you find an opinion of the
court on file and published," says Mr. Justice Harlan, "the profes-
sion has the right to take it as expressing the deliberate views of the
court based upon a careful examination of the records and briefs by
each justice participating in the judgment." 50  Such loose practice
as is shown by the early case of Holliday v. Brown5" where the
Supreme Court of Nebraska declared that it was bound only by the
head notes of its own opinions, would not be tolerated in the United
States Supreme Court. Each justice of the United States Supreme
Court "examines every case and passes his individual judgment
upon it. No case in the Supreme Court is ever referred to any one
justice or to several of the justices to decide and report to the others.
Every suitor, however humble, is entitled to and receives the judg-
ment of every justice upon his case."58
55. Bryce's Am. Com., Vol. I, 276.
56. 3o Am. Rev. 9o4.
57. 34 Neb. 232.
58. Mr. Justice Field in Carson's U. S. Supreme Court, p. 713. It may be
well to note here that the compensation paid to the Supreme Court justices has
been a gradually increasing one. Under the Act of February 12, 1903, (32
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While the justices of the Supreme Court of the United States
have been painstaking and conscientious, the lawyers that have
appeared before them have been of high rank. It was great, but
deserved, praise which Mr. Justice Harlan gave those lawyers when
he said: "Whatever of honor has come to that court for the manner
in which it has discharged the momentous trust committed to it by
the Constitution must be shared by the bar of America."' 9 This
matter is mentioned because there is a growing belief among law-
yers that they are falling in public estimation, 0 and it behooves them
to see that the courts are not injured thereby. The Supreme Court
of the United States is one institution of which we lawyers are
justly proud and no injury must come to it through us.
It was in 1895 that Sir Frederick Pollock first suggested in an
address at Harvard"' that some plan be devised whereby the
Supreme Court of the United States and the British House of Lords,
or the Supreme Court of the United States and the English Privy
Council, might co-operate so as to reach the same decision in those
matters of general commercial principle in which the Supreme Court
of the United States properly declared that "a diversity in the law
as administered on the two sides of the Atlantic is greatly to be
deprecated." Since Sir Frederick Pollock's suggestion no steps
have been taken looking towards its adoption, but much that he had
in mind is being accomplished by uniform state law enactments on
commercial subjects based on English models. After all, the
Supreme Courts of our different states are more concerned with
purely judicial questions than is the Supreme Court of the United
States, and it is doubtless due to the fact that the United States
Supreme Court's main business is deciding questions in American
constitutional law with which the English are unconcerned that has
kept Sir Frederick Pollock's suggestion from being carried out.
When the cry for uniform state legislation has been satisfied, we
may recur with enthusiasm to his plan, and may yet find the highest
judicial tribunals in the world of English law assisting one another,
as he urges that they should, "in matters of great weight and gene-
U. S. Stats. at Large, p. 825) the associate justices get $12,5oo a year each
and the chief justice $13,ooo. Any United States judge who has held his
commission at least ten years, and has attained the age of seventy years, may
resign his office, but continue during the rest of his natural life to draw the
same salary which was by law payable to him at the time of his resignation.
U. S. Rev. Stats., Sec. 714.
59. Carson's Supreme Court of the U. S., p. 721.
6o. See an interesting address by Mr. Edward M. Shepard in 18 Green
Bag 6or.
61. 29 Amer. Law Rev. 6z-3.
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ral importance to the common law." Mr. Justice Nelson served on
the Alabama Claims Commission; Mr. Justice Harlan was arbi-
trator in the Behring Sea Dispute; and Mr. Justice Brewer was
a member of the Venezuelan Boundary Commission; and it cer-
tainly is not too much to hope that some day we shall see justices
of the United States Supreme Court, individually if not collectively,
exchanging opinions on litigated cases with the highest courts in
England, and thus bringing nearer the day of an international judi-
cial tribunal of real dignity and power.
George P. Costigan, Jr..
Lincoln, Nebraska.
